Parliamentary Coalitions, An n-person Game Approach to Politics

Ioannis E. Fountas, Panagiotis K. Kampisioulis, Stylianos Th. Drakatos


In this paper, we present the general contribution of n-person game in turbulent environment of parliamentary coalitions. Same basic data about the coalition form and the characteristic function is necessary in order to connect n-person game theory and behavioral game theory. Taking the Norway elections as an example we study the possibility of a required long term coalition in Greece. We potentially suggest which parties could form a coalition by using game theory for those cases, where the choice of one party government is not possible.

JEL Classification: C, C7, C71.

Keywords: Game theory, N-person game, Characteristic function, Parliamentary coalitions.

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η δικτυακή πύλη της ευρωπαϊκής ένωσης ψηφιακή ελλάδα ΕΣΠΑ 2007-2013